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Introduction
The actual impact of the severe restrictions to the rights of individuals 
introduced by the Italian government to deal with the Covid-19 emergency 
cannot be understood through the simple reading of the different legal 
provisions enacted in the last month, and neither is sufficient the review 
of the several scholarly articles that have been published on the subject 
over a short time, mostly to assess the compatibility of such provisions 
with the guarantees enshrined in the constitution1.
The choice of the government guided by Giuseppe Conte – a pro-
fessor of private law without any previous political profile – when Italy 
found itself in the uncomfortable situation of first European country to 
be touched by the Covid-19 pandemic was to introduce a “lockdown” 
that, besides the stop to all economic activities not deemed essential, 
implied the prohibition for individuals to leave home without a specific 
justification based on one of the grounds identified in the relevant decrees 
enacted by the executive.
1 Among the most relevant articles see AZZARITI, Gaetano, I limiti costituzionali della situ-
azione d’emergenza provocata dal Covid-19, Questione giustizia online, March 27, 2020; MASSA 
PINTO, Ilenia, La tremendissima lezione del Covid-19 (anche) ai giuristi, Questione giustizia 
online March 18, 2020; CIVININI, Maria Giuliana e SCARSELLI, Giuliano, Emergenza 
sanitaria. Dubbi di costituzionalità di un giudice e di un avvocato, Questione giustizia online, April 14, 
2020. 
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This exceptional legal regime, without precedents in Italy after WW 
II, was adopted and implemented with the support of a public awareness 
campaign based on the slogan “I stay at home” (Io resto a casa), which iden-
tified the simple fact of “staying at home” as the ultimate contribution 
that an individual can give to the fight against the pandemic. Citizens 
are under a constant communication flow pressuring for compliance 
with the lockdown rules, where pure mediatic products are mixed with 
statements from political actors, all conveying their own reading of the 
content of the “positive law”.
The reading that dominates in the media is, however, sometimes partly 
different from the actual content of the relevant legal instruments, at 
least according to their text as constructed according to ordinary rules 
of interpretation. Discrepancies are often due also to unclear commu-
nication by public institutions (and by the prime minister himself), and 
the overall confusion is increased by a variety of acts by local authorities 
(at region and municipality level) that try to include even harsher restric-
tions, sometimes disregarding the statutory allocation of rule-making 
power between different levels of government.
This normative and communicative chaos created a situation where 
citizens have objective difficulties in understanding the actual scope of 
their residual freedom of movement2, but at the same time also one where 
the different police forces involved in the enforcement of the lockdown 
enjoy an extreme degree of discretion on whether to authorize or not 
individuals to move in the public space. A discretion that was often used 
to serve priorities selected by the media, mostly by providing “visual evi-
dence” of situations that at first sight appeared to violate the lockdown.
The enforcement patterns and the underlying legislative style that 
in Italy dominate the Covid-19 emergency are, however, not completely 
new in the recent development of the legal system, since they are fully in 
line with the policies designed, for different purposes of social control, 
by the self-labeled “populist” governments that ruled Italy following 
the last political elections. Within these policies frequently the formal 
validity of the legal provisions, and the possibility of the sanctions to 
stand if challenged in court, were not the object of a special attention 
2 This point has been raised by PAPA, Michele, Decreti e norme vaghe tradotti sui media: la 
comunicazione che inquina il diritto, Il Dubbio, April 21, 2020.
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by the policymakers, that were more interested in obtaining deterrence 
through the perception by individuals of a risk – actual or not – of being 
sanctioned.
While these legal strategies were previously used only against marginal 
groups, for instance beggars that administrations wanted to eject from 
the city centers, under the Covid-19 emergency they appear to be the 
default solution, apparently yet without reaction by the public, that feels 
them as an unavoidable tool to pursue the protection of public health.
The hardline policy chosen by the Conte government, that not only 
curtails economic activity but also strongly limits basic individual free-
doms is not only perceived (out of a limited circle of liberal legal scholars 
and journalists) by most of the Italian population as a wise choice, at least 
for the time being. It became also a matter of national pride, with all 
the major newspapers unanimously labelling as “irresponsible” foreign 
governments that allegedly did not follow the Italian lockdown model, 
considered as the only effective solution. In this respect as well, nothing 
must be easily taken at face value. Even a cursory analysis of the cove-
rage by the Italian media of the legal solutions introduced elsewhere is 
sufficient to highlight that, while legal nationalism can maybe be of some 
comfort for the public in an extreme situation, before proudly affirming 
that the restrictions of rights and freedoms imposed on Italian society are 
crucial in fighting the pandemic it will be wise to humbly look around 
a little bit more.
1. From law “in the books” to “law in the press”: the “physical activity” 
issue under the Covid lockdown rules
The legal tools introduced in the context of the Covid pandemic stre-
tched to their outer limits the rule-making powers that can be used by 
the executive branch according to the Italian constitution. The 1948 
Constitution indeed does not foresee a “state of emergency”, but only 
provisions applicable in the state of war. The government therefore issued 
in a first stage a line of decrees based on the declaration of statutory state 
of emergency that was issued at the end of January3. In different steps 
3 Delibera del consiglio dei ministri 31 gennaio 2020, Dichiarazione dello stato di emergenza 
in conseguenza del rischio sanitario connesso all’insorgenza di patologie derivanti da agenti virali 
trasmissibili.
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undertaken in swift succession, the government introduced thereafter 
a severe “lockdown” of the whole country, that eventually brought inter 
alia to the prohibition of movement between different municipalities, 
of any travel abroad, the interruption of all “productive, industrial and 
commercial” activities (when these cannot performed remotely), out of 
those specifically foreseen in a list of essential ones, and the imposition 
of leaving one’s home only for certain purposes enumerated by the 
government. The lockdown regime in its current form is in force until 
May 4, and will be most probably be renewed, probably in a slightly less 
strict version.
Let’s focus on the section of this legal regime that is most intrusive on 
individual freedoms. Eventually the government issued on March 25 a 
“decree law”4, to provide a more proper legislative basis to the measures 
adopted. The decree states inter alia that the government is empowered 
to introduce “limitations of the circulation of persons, even establishing 
limitations to the possibility to move from one’s residence, domicile or 
abode out of individual movements limited in time and space or moti-
vated by work needs, situations of necessity or urgency, health or other 
specific reasons”5.
This legislative basis serves as foundation of the more detailed final 
rule introduced in a further government decree, reconnecting with 
previous ones, according to which individuals are allowed to move from 
their homes only for “proven work reasons or situations of necessity or 
work reasons, and that – in any case – it is forbidden to move in a muni-
cipality different from the one where they are currently located, with 
private or public means of transport, out of proven work reasons, absolute 
urgency, or health reasons”, while a further sub-section establishes that 
any “outdoor game or recreational activity is forbidden; it is permitted 
to individually practice physical activity in the proximity of one’s home, 
4 In the Italian system “decree laws” (decreti legge) are legislative acts that according to the 
constitution can be enacted by the government in “extraordinary cases of necessity and 
urgency” and that, in order to keep their validity, must be converted by the parliament 
within sixty days (see art. 77 Constitution).
5 Decreto-legge 25 marzo 2020, n. 19, Misure urgenti per fronteggiare l’emergenza epidemiologica 
da COVID-19, art. 2 a).
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assuming, however, the respect of the distance of one meter from any 
other person”6.
The decree law of March 25 specifies also that the municipalities can-
not adopt transitional decrees “in conflict with the state measures”, that 
would be otherwise devoid of any validity7. The same applies to those of 
the regions, with some differences.
These words, passed through a long chain of decrees, do not have a 
significant political history behind them, but certainly a majestic mediatic 
one. The sub-section addressed to the municipalities represents indeed 
a reaction against the flood of ordinances issued by a number of mayors 
across Italy that aimed at applying locally an even stricter “stay at home” 
policy. Usually these local ordinances were widely advertised in national 
newspapers, even if their application was a matter of relatively small 
towns. While their legal validity, even before the law decree of March 
25, could have been objected, such acts were part of broader visibility 
campaigns that sometimes brought to the attention of an international 
public local administrators of minor Italian centers8.
It would be naïve to think that the “fault line” between municipalities 
and the State concerned mighty health risk management issues, like 
those that all over Europe were discussed on a daily basis. This was not 
6 Decreto del presidente del consiglio dei ministri 10 aprile 2020 , Ulteriori disposizioni attuative del 
decreto-legge 25 marzo 2020, n. 19, recante misure urgenti per fronteggiare l’emergenza epidemiologica 
da COVID-19, applicabili sull’intero territorio nazionale, artt. 1 a) and 1 f ). Our translation, 
in the original version 1 a) sounds “sono consentiti solo gli spostamenti motivati da comprovate 
esigenze lavorative o situazioni di necessità ovvero per motivi di salute e, in ogni caso, è fatto di- vieto a 
tutte le persone fisiche di trasferirsi o spostarsi, con mezzi di trasporto pubblici o privati, in un comune 
diverso rispetto a quello in cui attualmente si trovano, salvo che per comprovate esigenze lavorative, di 
asso- luta urgenza ovvero per motivi di salute e resta anche vietato ogni spostamento verso abitazioni 
diverse da quella principale comprese le seconde case utilizzate per vacanza”, while 1 f ) sounds “non 
è consentito svolgere attività ludica o ricre- ativa all’aperto; è consentito svolgere individualmente 
attività motoria in prossimità della propria abitazione, purché comunque nel rispetto della distanza 
di almeno un metro da ogni altra persona”.
7 See Decreto-legge 25 marzo 2020, n. 19, Misure urgenti per fronteggiare l’emergenza epidemiologica 
da COVID-19, art. 3.1 (regions), 3.2 (municipalities). In the original version art. 3.2 sounds “I 
Sindaci non possono adottare, a pena di ineffica- cia, ordinanze contingibili e urgenti dirette a fronteg-
giare l’emergenza in contrasto con le misure statali, né ecce- dendo i limiti di oggetto cui al comma 1”.
8 See for instance GIUFFRIDA, Angela, This is not a film’: Italian mayors rage at virus lockdown 
dodgers, The Guardian, March 23, 2020.
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the case, while the most frequent “legal pluralism clashes” concerned 
“runners” or – in the further term used in this kind of acts – those who 
practice “jogging”. A huge number of mayors, and at least one governor 
of region (Campania)9 issued indeed ordinances or “clarifications” sta-
ting that even individual sport activity (usually identified primarily with 
running) was completely forbidden.
Any google search would give an impressing number of entries, pro-
viding ample evidence that banning runners was perceived as a priority 
by a substantial share of mayors. Once again, such local acts, particularly 
after the March 25 decree law, were definitely illegal, and could have 
been conceived at most as transitional emergency measures in case of a 
sudden increase in local risk levels, which is never mentioned. In at least 
one very recent case concerning the town of Pescara, the local Prefetto 
invited the mayor to withdraw one such ordinance that was considered 
as a clear violation of the duty of loyal cooperation10, as well as a possible 
source of confusion among law enforcers due to its absence of adequate 
legal ground.
As mentioned in the note of the Prefetto of Pescara, if taken seriously 
and actually enforced, the ordinance of the mayor could have implied 
legal consequences of some magnitude. Any fine issued by the local police 
would have for instance possibly implied a liability of the administration 
with an obligation to refund and pay damages. These legal consequences 
were likely to be mostly theoretical, since the overall impression that 
one gets from the news is that actual enforcement against “runners” was 
not a priority of the mayors. The practical functions of the ordinances 
were to serve as fake legal basis to the local police to pressure runners 
to minimize their presence in public spaces, and to obtain the headlines 
on the local and national media. In other words, the hunt was far more 
important than the prey...
This approach was per se rational, if one thinks about the mayors 
in terms of what they are, i.e. political actors. Mayors did not have any 
serious indicator that runners implied any specific risk of contagion, but 
were anyhow under a massive and constant pressure coming from the 
9 Giunta Regionale della Campania, chiarimento n.6 del 14 marzo 2020.
10 Ansa, April 15, 2020, Coronavirus: prefetto Pescara, ordinanza sindaco inefficace; VERCESI, Paolo, 
Coronavirus, Pescara finisce sulla stampa cinese, il Messaggero (edizione Abruzzo), April 21, 2020. 
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media, that “targeted” runners with arguments maybe not so sound but 
very powerful in terms of creation of “moral panic”. Among the hundreds 
one can find on line, one is especially interesting, since it comes from a 
quasi-official site, that of the Campania section of the Italian Association 
of Municipalities (Associazione Nazionale Comuni d’Italia- ANCI), which 
says “These behaviors [the fact of running] are legal but profoundly 
wrong. […] . It is otherwise difficult to imagine that in the towns mar-
tyrized by wars, like Sarajevo or Aleppo, people run around under the 
bombs. With an invisible enemy, like this virus, one must apply even 
more caution”11. The text of the “clarification” openly stresses that the 
administration issued it after “TV programmes” revealed the frequent 
presence of persons making some sort of physical activity. The mayors 
reacted thus to a clear input of the media that raised the alarm against 
the alleged violation of the lockdown, while they were clearly aware 
that in most of Italy “runners” are, however, a minority of the voting 
population.
The endless number of ordinances and news reports conceal the 
simplicity of the situation from the perspective of a traditional lawyer. 
Since the early versions of the lockdown ordinances, their text constantly 
allowed to go out of home for “physical activity” (attività motoria), and a 
circular letter of the Minister of Interior specified that the concept of 
physical activity does not imply only “sporting activity (“jogging”)12, 
but also simply walking, something that appears as reasonable conside-
ring the benefit of physical exercise also for persons who are less fit. But 
the official text was captured in a mediatic game that made it rapidly 
irrelevant, absorbed by the rhetoric of the “Stay at home” campaign. 
As recognized by the Minister of Health, the inclusion in the lockdown 
regulation of the possibility of “physical activity” was due to scientific 
advice, that considered it necessary in order to minimize the negative 
health consequences of a longer lockdown, clearly balancing costs and 
benefits. The Minister of Health, under a fire of criticisms, eventually 
accepted to mediate introducing the unclear limit of the “proximity” 
11 ANCI Campania, March 14, 2020, Chiarimento della Regione mette fine al paradosso: non si 
può fare jogging.
12 Circolare Ministero dell’Interno, March 31, 2020, N. 15350/117(2) Uff.III-Prot.Civ. 
402
COVID-19  E OS IMPACTOS NO DIREITO
from the home of the person, which generated a range of interpretations 
varying between 150 and 1000 meters13.
In an ordinary situation, a solution like the one just mentioned would 
ordinarily introduce a wide discretion in the hands of law enforcers for 
establishing what means “proximity to home”, but with no harm to the 
possibility to perform moderate outdoor activity not linked to purchasing 
of food, tobacco (exempted by the lockdown), pharmaceutical items. But 
under a media coverage constantly and obsessively reporting the local 
prohibitions to physical activity, the widely shared public perception, 
the “popular legal culture”, was that running and the like was a “legally 
grey area”, rather than an activity clearly authorized expressis verbis, and 
well rooted in the fundamental freedoms temporarily suspended in the 
lockdown. Many persons therefore abstained from any kind of outdoor 
exercise.
The Covid pandemic thus gave us the opportunity of a mass experi-
ment of legal sociology after which we learned that what matters is not 
only the difference between “law in the books” and “law in action”, but 
how the “law in the books” becomes first “law in the press”, before – later 
on – moving to action.
2. The “last meter of the rule of law”: populist legal strategies ante 
and post Covid
The paradoxical battles around the possibility to prohibit physical exercise 
outdoor, notwithstanding the standard legal sources clearly authorized 
it, was in our opinion a symbolic battle that some mayors appreciated 
as an opportunity to get political points with an easy fight, not invol-
ving complex decisions like e.g. those concerning economic activity. 
Moreover, from the fact that the harassment against runners had weak 
legal ground derived that it seems seldom used to issue actual fines. The 
stake in terms of social control was, after all, limited and concerned a 
limited number of persons moving on foot. The life-changing novelty 
for average Italians was instead the necessity, to simply get out of home, 
of providing a justification based on vague concepts as “necessity” and 
13 SANGIA, A. La difficile sorte dell’attività motoria nell’ordinanza del ministro della salute al tempo 
del coronavirus, Il Sole –24 Ore, March 27, 2020.
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so on, particularly if crossing a border between two municipalities, even 
more a regional border.
In order to ensure the effectiveness of such restrictions, the first ver-
sions of the decrees provided for the application of a criminal sanction, 
establishing that the violation of the basic lockdown rules violated article 
650 of the criminal code, punishing the breach of orders of the public 
authority. After a while, it became clear that this would have implied a 
load of several tens of thousands of files in the prosecution offices all over 
Italy, with a likely collapse of the system and the impossibility to process 
all of them. In the last decrees, the criminal sanction was thus left only 
for especially serious violations, like breach of the quarantine by those 
who are found Covid-19 positive, while ordinary lockdown violations 
bring only an administrative fine. It is interesting to note, however, that 
this reduction of the scope of application of criminal law met (notwi-
thstanding the practical problems above mentioned) the opposition of 
some heads of prosecution offices, one of whom even proposed the intro-
duction of a new ad hoc crime, that would have allowed law enforcement 
officers to arrest on the spot anyone found in violation of all ordinary lockdown 
rules14.
The perception that criminal law, or at least severe administrative 
sanctions supported by far-reaching “muscular” police monitoring, is 
the ultimate solution when behavior modifications are needed is since 
several years dominant within Italian society, across the whole political 
spectrum but with a special penchant for the populist political groups, 
like the Lega Nord and the Five Stars movement. It is therefore not strange 
that the first lockdown instruments relied on the use of criminal law.
On a closer look, it is – however – important to note that the populist 
trend does not have the preference for criminal law as sole feature, but it 
also has a further pillar represented by the frequent use of rules that can 
give to law enforcers a wide discretion whether to start or not the process 
(prosecution, but also application of administrative fines) bringing to 
punishment. A punishment that – even if of an administrative nature – 
can sometimes bring to serious consequences due to the amount of the 
fine or to indirect legal effects.
14 The proposal was of Luigi Patronaggio, public prosecutor in Agrigento, la Repubblica, 
March 27, 2020
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This strategy was developed in multiple occasions in pre-Covid times, 
in the context of situations where there was an interest in “cleaning” 
towns from beggars and other persons living as marginals. Examples 
could be the reintroduction of the crime of “intrusive begging” and the 
introduction of harsher prison sentences for persons occupying pieces 
of land or buildings, as well as the introduction within local police regu-
lations of provisions sanctioning “nuisance” in the streets15.
All the tools just mentioned have in common one point: in most cases 
the individual law enforcement officer will not suffer any consequence 
if he or she will not take action, by notifying the prosecutor or issuing 
the ticket. This will be simply his or her choice. He will be in a way the 
master of the “last meter of the rule of law”, of those “face to face” situ-
ations where the decision of the officer will make the difference between 
on the one hand starting a criminal case or the application of a heavy 
administrative fine, and on the other hand nothing. A decision that is 
especially important in the Italian system, since the constitution contains 
(art. 112) a principle of compulsory prosecution, according to which the 
prosecutor cannot withdraw prosecution on grounds of expediency. In 
one of the “security decrees” of the former populist government, it was 
also decided to take away for a number of typical “street crimes” the 
previously existing possibility to acquit when the fact was of very tiny 
relevance.
This strategy, together with the intrinsic vagueness of some categories 
(“nuisance”, “necessity”, etc.) brings frequently to a situation where the 
meeting between law enforcement officers and citizens becomes a nego-
tiation, where the power of the officer is counterbalanced by the capacity 
of the citizen to show himself as a “mainstream” person, and even better 
as one who has a significant cultural, social and relational capital.
At the same time, this f lexibility in choosing whether to set the 
machine into motion or not, brings to a system where enforcement can 
be easily steered by political actors, putting police pressure on specific 
social groups. At the same time, particularly at local level, enforcement 
can be targeted and directed in line with the media. Very frequent in my 
experience are e.g. situations where a local newspaper with continuous 
15 PAILLI, Giacomo, Applicazione selettiva del diritto e strategie di tenuta a distanza dello straniero, 
forthcoming in Diritto, Immigrazione e Cittadinanza, 2020. 
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presentation of pictures of a certain group of beggars in a city center gives 
the impression of an “invasion”, thus forcing administrators to intervene.
The Covid-19 emergency extended the possibility to use such stra-
tegies beyond even the wildest dream of a populist policy maker. It will 
be interesting to see whether the end of the emergency will bring back 
the point of balance of the law enforcement process a little more distant 
from the “last meter of the rule of law”.
3. Blaming the “others”: the “comparative law” of populism
Choices like the lockdown decided by the government of Giuseppe Conte 
are unavoidably accompanied by mediatic efforts to create a cohesion in 
the whole population and a trust for the policy makers. These can be 
supported by different lines of arguments, and a typical one is the pre-
sentation of other similar contexts in which the approach worked. Since 
this was not possible in the Italian case, due to our unfortunate priority 
in receiving the pandemic, the debate has taken a very nationalistic 
approach, with very little serious information on other countries and a 
tendency to blame those who do not follow the “Italian style”.
A preferred target of Italian newspapers in the last month has been 
Sweden, where the government decided not adopt any lockdown, simply 
issuing detailed non-binding recommendations, until now introducing 
only a ban on public gatherings of more than 50 persons, and provi-
ding by law the government with rule making powers (not yet used) 
to introduce binding restrictions without the previous vote of the 
parliament16.
The two Italian leading newspapers, la Repubblica and Corriere della Sera 
published a series of articles where the Swedish strategy was presented 
as a cynical exercise disregarding lives. Articles objectively distorted the 
meaning of a speech of the Prime Minister, always giving the impression 
of a forthcoming change of strategy that until now has instead never been 
on the table. The weaknesses of the way in which the Swedish Covid-19 
strategy was reported were such that the Swedish ambassador in Rome 
published an open letter of protest17.
16 Lag om ändring i smittskyddslagen (2004:168) of April 17, 2020. 
17 La Svezia contro I giornali italiani, il Post, April 16, 2020
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An interesting aspect of the Italian criticisms is the frequent reference 
to an alleged link between the liberal policy adopted by Sweden and 
its higher number of victims compared to the neighbors, particularly 
Denmark and Norway, where mortality due to Covid is apparently still 
low. This is constantly presented as an evidence that a lockdown “Italian 
style” is an indispensable tool to control the pandemic. Such media 
debates neglect, however, one relevant point, i.e. that the restrictions 
introduced in Denmark and Norway have little in common with those 
introduced in Italy, and what is less in common are indeed the restrictions 
on individual freedom of movement. Denmark e.g. simply forbids public 
gatherings outdoor of more than ten persons. If the Nordic countries 
can suggest something, is thus maybe that very strict limitations on the 
individual freedom of movement are not per se a “silver bullet” against 
Covid-19.
Conclusions
The Covid-19 emergency is submitting the Italian legal system to a “stress 
test”, but not in the sense of an immediate risk of democratic backsliding, 
since there is no sign of anyone willing to exploit the crisis to set aside for 
good constitutional guarantees. The test is rather in the sense of giving 
further momentum to a trend reinforced under the previous populist 
government and not interrupted by the present one, represented by the 
expansion of a law enforcement sector with broad hidden discretionary 
powers and accustomed to establish its priorities under the pressure of 
the media and of political actors.
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